Whereas the leaders of the Comintern attempted to cover up their hesitations and mistakes in relation to Germany, Trotsky used every possible avenue to spell out the lessons of the defeat. In his article “Through What Stage are We Passing?” he explained:
It is very difficult for a revolutionary party to make the transition from a period of agitation and propaganda, prolonged over many years, to the direct struggle for power through the organization of an armed insurrection. This turn inevitably gives rise to a crisis within the party. Every responsible communist must be prepared for this. One of the ways of being prepared is to make a thorough study of the entire factual history of the October revolution. Up to now extremely little has been done in this connection, and the experience of October was most inadequately utilized by the German party….A growth in the party’s political influence was taking place automatically. A sharp tactical turn was needed. It was necessary to show the masses, and above all the party itself, that this time it was a matter of immediate preparation for the seizure of power.
Trotsky then went on to elaborate a number of changes that would have to take place to meet the new situation:
It was necessary to consolidate the party’s growing influence organizationally and to establish bases of support for a direct assault on the state. It was necessary to shift the full party organization onto the basis of factory cells. It was necessary to form cells on the railways. It was necessary to raise sharply the question of work in the army. It was necessary, especially necessary, to adapt the united front tactic fully and completely to these tasks, to give it a firmer and more decided tempo and a more revolutionary character. On the basis of this, work of a military-technical nature should have been carried out.
The question of setting a date for the uprising can have significance only in this connection and with this perspective. Insurrection is an art. An art presumes a clear aim, a precise plan, and consequently a schedule.
The most important thing, however, was this: to ensure in good time the decisive tactical turn toward the seizure of power. And this was not done. This was the chief and fatal omission.
Trotsky went on to explain that the KPD having burnt its fingers in the March Action, avoided, for a protracted period of time, the very idea of organizing the revolution:
The party’s political activity was carried on at a peacetime tempo at a time when the denouement was approaching. The timing for the uprising was fixed when, in essentials, the enemy had already made use of the time lost by the party and strengthened his position. The party’s military-technical preparation, begun at feverish speed, was divorced from the party’s political activity, which was carried on at the previous peacetime tempo. The masses did not understand the party and did not keep step with it. The party at once felt its severance from the masses, and proved to be paralyzed. From this resulted the sudden withdrawal from first-class positions without a fight – the bitterest of all possible defeats.
These valuable observations were later developed extensively in Trotsky’s brilliant pamphlet Lessons of October published in September 1924, which compared the vacillations of the German leadership with that of Zinoviev and Kamenev on the eve of the October Revolution.