The leaders of the International in discussions with the German Communists concluded that Germany was rapidly approaching revolution, and that technical preparations for the insurrection should be undertaken. To break the KPD’s routinism, Trotsky urged that the Party set a date for the insurrection but this was rejected by Radek and the German KPD leader Brandler. The German Party had already established its secret military organization, the M-Apparat, which had been strengthened by Red Army experts. In many towns and factories, armed defence groups had been established throughout the year, which were organized into “Proletarian Hundreds”. They numbered 300 in May and by October reached 800, with more than 100,000 men in total. These had first come into being during the Rathenau Campaign of 1922.
By the end of September inflation spiralled out of control. A day’s wage of a Hamburg docker came to 17 billion marks. Industrial production began to decline drastically and the “resistance” in the Ruhr was costing the German bourgeois far too much. As a result, on 26 September the Stresemann government announced the end of passive resistance.
The KPD laid elaborate plans to enter the left Social Democratic governments of Saxony and Thuringia, which were under serious threat from the central government. Any action against these left governments was to be used as the excuse for launching a revolutionary counteroffensive. Plans were laid for a national general strike which would be the basis for an insurrection. In October, on Brandler’s arrival back from Moscow, he and two other leading Communists entered the government in Saxony. Three days later, KPD representatives entered the government of Thuringia.
For the central government, such developments could not be tolerated. The situation was reaching a climax.
With the support of President Ebert, the Reichswehr stepped up their pressure against Saxony and Thuringia. General Müller issued a direct order banning the Proletarian Hundreds in Saxony, giving them three days in which to give up their arms. The ultimatum was ignored. On 21 October Müller’s troops entered Saxony. Everything was coming to a head. The KPD leaders acted swiftly to alert the Party and bring forward the plans for insurrection.
A trade union conference at Chemnitz was hastily chosen as the launching pad for a national general strike of defence. Unfortunately the delegates attending the conference were hopelessly out of touch with the developing situation. After Brandler had spoken outlining the case for a general strike to oppose Müller, he was fiercely opposed by the Social Democratic Minister Graupe. He threatened that if the resolution calling for a general strike was put to the meeting then the Social Democrats would walk out. After this farcical stand, Brandler felt that there was no alternative but to abandon the plans for a general strike and insurrection. Within a few days the government troops were able to remove the head of the Saxon government, Zeigner, without any resistance. A partially supported general strike simply petered out.