Such accounts could be repeated many times. The working class, having exerted itself to the maximum during the nine days, was stunned by the capitulation of the leadership. They felt betrayed and disoriented. What had gone wrong? Why was the strike called off, just when it was gathering momentum?
The British Worker’s last strike edition on the Wednesday evening ran the headline – “Strike Terminated Today – Trades Union Congress General Council Satisfied That Miners Will Now Get a Fair Deal.” Of course, there was no “fair deal” on offer. On Saturday 15 May, the TUC newspaper attacked its critics, claiming that the “General Council acted with courage in ending the stoppage”! But they were now forced to admit publicly that there were no official assurances or undertakings given by the government. Churchill’s British Gazette was much less evasive. “Unconditional Withdrawal of Notices by TUC,” it proclaimed on Thursday morning. “Men to Return Forthwith. Surrender Received by Premier in Downing Street.” The Daily Mail went further, and announced the “Surrender of the Revolutionaries”.
The leaders of the TUC – not just the right wing but also the so-called Left – had no confidence in the working class, and no confidence in themselves. They had blundered into the strike and were terrified by the implications of the whole affair. The TUC had surrendered completely. Once again, they had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. This view was summed up by Charles Dukes of the General and Municipal Workers:
Every day that the strike proceeded the control and the authority of that dispute was passing out of the hands of responsible executives into the hands of men who had no authority, no control, and was wrecking the movement from one end to the other.
Nothing could be clearer. Unfortunately, the Lefts on the General Council acted no differently from the right wing. Purcell was chair of the TUC’s Organisation Committee and was involved in the negotiations to end the strike. Hicks was foremost in rejecting the magnificent £100,000 donation raised by Russian workers for the strike, referring to it as “damned Moscow Gold.” The Lefts on the General Council offered no opposition to the capitulation of the right wing. In the words of the Daily Herald, “the TUC packed up and went home.” They feared the consequences of complete victory more than those of a negotiated defeat.
Many advanced workers could understand the actions of Thomas and Co., but were shocked by the role of the Left. In reality, there was no fundamental difference between them. The two tendencies they represented are what Marxists would describe as left and right reformism. Both tendencies accept the capitalist system. The left reformists would like the capitalists to behave in a more humane manner and give concessions to the workers. This is like trying to teach a man-eating tiger to become a vegetarian. Sometimes, in a period of economic upswing, the capitalists are prepared to make concessions. But in a period of economic crisis they are implacable. Reforms in such periods can only be achieved as the by-product of an all-out revolutionary struggle.
In the last analysis the “Lefts” will unite with the right wing because they have no perspective of a fundamental change in society, and fear the independent movement of the workers. We have seen this many times in the history of the movement. Therefore, while it is necessary to support the Left trade union leaders against the right wing, it is necessary to keep them under firm control, to support them only when they defend correct policies and to consistently criticise their vacillations and mistakes. One must also distinguish between words and deeds. “Fine words butter no parsnips”, the proverb states, and “left” speeches are no use unless they lead to action. Therefore, our support for the left reformists must be of a highly critical nature, and never unconditional. This was the big mistake made by the young and inexperienced Communist Party of Britain in 1926.
The Communist Party, which many militant workers looked towards, was largely responsible for fostering illusions in the Lefts on the TUC:
“Although we knew of what treachery the right wing leaders were capable, we did not clearly understand the part played by the so-called ‘left’ in the union leadership”, stated the Communist leader, George Hardie. “In the main they turned out to be windbags and capitulated to the right wing. We were taught a major lesson; that while developing a move to the left officially, the main point in preparing for the action must always be to develop a class conscious leadership among the rank and file.”[8]
But it was too late. Their uncritical policy towards the “Lefts”, encouraged by the Stalin-Bukharin faction in Moscow, had given a spurious “revolutionary” aura to Purcell, Hicks, Swales and the others. Even the most genuine left leader, Arthur Cook, proved unable to maintain an independent position, displayed great confusion and played a negative role, especially after the defeat, when his actions served to disorientate hundreds of thousands of activists.
Could the General Strike have led to revolution in Britain? The answer to this question has already been given. Objectively, there was no reason why the powerful British working class could not have taken power in 1926. The workers’ organisations were already beginning to take the running of society into their hands. But in order to carry the movement forward, a genuine revolutionary leadership was necessary. The Communist Party, having adopted the flexible line and tactics that Lenin had urged upon it, had built up considerable support in the Minority Movement. It was not yet strong enough to take the leadership of the unions into its hands, but by pursuing an energetic and independent policy it could have emerged from the general strike – even in the event of a defeat – enormously strengthened. By following the opportunist line dictated by Moscow, they threw the chance away.
Although the Communist Party’s membership increased during the strike from 6,000 to 10,800, the new recruits quickly fell by the wayside in disappointment. Trotsky earlier predicted a “decisive advance” of the British CP, but this was based upon correct policy, tactics and strategy – all of which was lacking. Unfortunately, by playing second fiddle to the “Lefts” on the TUC, the Communists lost the opportunity to build a mass base in the British trade union movement. When the “Lefts” capitulated to the right wing, the CPGB could not escape their share of the blame. This whole experience, and the deep demoralisation that accompanied it, served to undermine the Minority Movement that had clung to the coat tails of the “Lefts”.
The workers felt totally let down by their own leaders. It was left up to the rank and file and local leadership to save the situation from developing into a rout. When they heard of the conditions being offered by the employers, railworkers, dockers, engineering workers and other sections actually renewed the strike, which continued unofficially for several more days. But the back of the General Strike was broken, and many workers were forced to fight a rearguard struggle against victimisation.
The ruling class, for its part, was delighted with the outcome.
“Having got through the strike, and having once and for all laid the bogey of the General Strike, it would be easier for future governments to deal with the threatened strikes”, said Joynson-Hicks in a speech to the Primrose League on 20 May. “All they would have to do would be to say, ‘Look at 1926. We burst your bogey. We have shown the impossibility of holding the country to ransom at the hands of any organised body of opinion’.”[9]