Lenin between the revolutions: the writings that led to October

The year 1917 stands out as a turning point in human history. For the first time, the downtrodden, toiling masses fought back – and won! But we can say with certainty that that victory was only possible because of the presence of a theoretically trained and practically steeled party, the most revolutionary party in history, the Bolshevik Party. But even that party would have failed to achieve such a task without the crystal-clear and razor-sharp leadership of Lenin. We publish here the introduction to a brand new selection of Lenin’s invaluable 1917 writings.

The Revolutions of 1917: Lenin Selected Writings is a new selection of Lenin’s works published by Wellred Books – the publishing house of the Revolutionary Communist International. In this introduction, Rob Sewell explains the immense lessons of 1917 for communists today, bringing out the development of Lenin’s ideas between the February and October revolutions.  

This text is essential reading for anyone who wants to study Lenin’s method in order to overthrow capitalism and imperialism today. Get your copy of The Revolutions of 1917: Lenin Selected Writings now from Wellred Books. The text is available as a physical book, an ebook, as well as an audiobook.

In this epoch of deepening crisis for world capitalism, there has never been a more appropriate time for the republication of Lenin’s writings. This new selection of Lenin’s letters and articles written in 1917, the year which culminated in the victory of the Russian working class, is especially important. The October Revolution was, after all, the greatest event in world history and showed that society could be run without bankers and capitalists.

These writings provide a remarkable insight into the thinking of Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik Party, without whom the revolution would not have succeeded. Above all, they trace how the October victory was achieved. They explain the abrupt changes throughout the year and how the Bolsheviks were able to prepare the working class for the eventual conquest of power.

These writings, which follow the torrents of revolution and counter-revolution in 1917, reveal the flexible approach of Lenin in addressing the problems thrown up at every stage. They are a classic application of the method of Marxism, applying a dialectical understanding to the ever-changing concrete situation. For the class-conscious worker, they constitute a veritable treasure trove of ideas.

The purpose of this introduction is not to provide a history of 1917, but simply to give a brief outline of Lenin’s approach to events. There are a number of classic works, which comprehensively cover this period and provide an in-depth understanding of the revolution. First and foremost among these is Leon Trotsky’s monumental study, The History of the Russian Revolution, which brilliantly dissects the revolution at every turn and explains the objective and subjective forces at play. Above all, he traces the passionate changes in consciousness in the masses, the motive force of the revolution. Trotsky writes in his opening lines:

"During the first two months of 1917 Russia was still a Romanov monarchy. Eight months later the Bolsheviks stood at the helm. They were little known to anybody when the year began, and their leaders were still under indictment for state treason when they came to power. You will not find another such sharp turn in history – especially if you remember that it involves a nation of 150 million people."^[1]

The first news of the February Revolution – the forcible entry of the masses onto the stage of history – and the overthrow of Russian tsarism reached Lenin in Zurich on 2 March, according to the Old Style calendar (15 March in the New Style), a whole week after the revolution erupted. ^[2]

He had been in exile for most of his adult life, and was the leader of what proved to be the most revolutionary party in history. Looking back, it can be said that Lenin’s whole life experience had prepared him for what was about to happen.

Foreign newspaper reports had confirmed that the revolution in Russia had established a bourgeois Provisional Government, and had thrown up a new power, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, the predecessor of which in 1905 Lenin had described as “an embryo of a provisional revolutionary government”. ^[3] The emergence of these two entities reflected a regime of ‘dual power’ that had suddenly come into being.

The superiority of Lenin was in his ability to immediately grasp the significance of what was taking place, and he promptly set about drafting an article for the Bolshevik paper Pravda that put forward the steps that needed to be taken by the Party.

Lenin was always fond of quoting a phrase from Goethe’s Faust: “Theory, my friend, is grey, but green is the eternal tree of life.” Life is always more varied and richer than the most brilliant theory. The revolution had thrown up a situation not fully envisaged previously. The task of the revolutionary party was to adapt to changing circumstances. And these required a sharp change in the Bolshevik Party’s orientation and tactics.

For Lenin, the fall of tsarism and the coming to power of a bourgeois Provisional Government was simply the first stage. The inability of this government to solve the problems confronting it placed the perspective of a new revolution on the agenda. In other words, the conquest of power by the working class was the only way the most elementary aspirations of the masses – peace, bread and freedom – could be achieved. Such a radical turn of events meant the abandonment of the old Bolshevik slogan of the democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry, which had been an algebraic formula based on the continuation of capitalism, but which had now been superseded. “The formula is obsolete”, he wrote later in a reply to Kamenev. “It is no good at all. It is dead. And it is no use trying to revive it.”^[4]

However, such a change was not straightforward or easily achieved. Whenever such a sharp turn is required, there is always resistance from those still tied to the past. And this was the case among the Bolshevik leaders. In fact, the only other person who independently came to the same conclusions as Lenin was Leon Trotsky, who was in exile in New York.

In his letter of farewell to Swiss workers, Lenin explained that the great honour of beginning the world revolution had fallen to the Russian proletariat. “Russia is a peasant country, one of the most backward of European countries. Socialism cannot triumph there directly and immediately”, he explained. ^[5] Lenin demonstrated his internationalism by stating that the Russian revolution would be “the prologue to the world socialist revolution, a step towards it.”^[6] He went on to praise the German proletariat, which was “the most trustworthy, the most reliable ally of the Russian and the world proletarian revolution.” ^[7]

For Lenin, internationalism was central, to which the fate of the Russian Revolution was inseparably linked. After all, Lenin knew full well, following in the footsteps of Marx and Engels, that the material basis for socialism, let alone a classless communist society, did not exist in backward Russia, but only on a world scale.

This selection of writings contains the first three of Lenin’s famous Letters From Afar, a series of five letters that outlined his perspectives and tasks, the last of which was unfinished and written on the eve of his departure from Switzerland for revolutionary Russia. However, only the first letter was ever published in Pravda, not least due to the resistance of Kamenev and Stalin, who were the first Bolshevik leaders to return to Petrograd and who adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Provisional Government.

Lenin had already sent an urgent telegram to the Bolshevik leaders in Russia stressing what needed to be done:

"Our tactics: no trust in and no support of the new government; Kerensky is especially suspect; arming of the proletariat is the only guarantee; immediate elections to the Petrograd City Council; no rapprochement with other parties. Telegraph this to Petrograd."^[8]

First and foremost, Lenin demanded no confidence in the Provisional Government, which was a bourgeois, pro-imperialist government. The working class needed to defend their own independent class point of view. Consequently, anyone who championed support for the Provisional Government was in Lenin’s view, “a traitor to the workers, traitor to the cause of the proletariat, to the cause of peace and freedom.” ^[9]

This telegram was a shot over the bow of those leaders, especially Kamenev and Stalin, who succumbed to the euphoria of the first wave of the revolution and were responsible for pursuing a conciliatory line in Pravda. They used the columns in the Bolshevik paper to rally support for the Provisional Government and the war effort “insofar as” it assisted the revolution.

Lenin came out with guns blazing in his first Letter in his usual straightforward style:

"Ours is a bourgeois revolution, therefore, the workers must support the bourgeoisie, say the Potresovs, Gvozdevs and Chkheidzes, as Plekhanov said yesterday."^[10]

No! Lenin replied emphatically:

"Ours is a bourgeois revolution, we Marxists say, therefore the workers must open the eyes of the people to the deception practised by the bourgeois politicians, teach them to put no faith in words, to depend entirely on their own strength, their own organisation, their own unity and their own weapons."^[11]

While Lenin was enthusiastic about the intervention of the masses, he was not the type of man who was intoxicated with revolutionary phrases. He took a very sober view of things. For him, the first revolution was simply a prelude to a second. He stressed:

"You must perform miracles of organisation, organisation of the proletariat and of the whole people, to prepare the way for your victory in the second stage of the revolution…"^[12]

He again defined the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, as in 1905, as:

"… the embryo of a workers’ government, the representative of the interests of the entire mass of the poor section of the population, i.e. of nine-tenths of the population, which is striving for peace, bread and freedom."^[13]

Through these writings, Lenin repeatedly explains that Marxist theory is not a dogma, but only a guide to action, and that the Bolsheviks needed to adapt their tactics to the swift and abrupt changes taking place.

The basic ideas contained in the Letters, especially the fifth letter, were developed in his other writings, such as ‘Letters on Tactics’ and ‘The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution’, all of which hammered home the change in the situation, which had to be met with a corresponding change in the political slogans raised by the Bolsheviks.

Prior to his return to Petrograd, Lenin was alone in this perspective. The ‘old Bolsheviks’ were stuck in the past and failed to see the significance of the changes taking place under their very nose. When Lenin’s April Theses were published in Pravda, Kamenev as an editor wrote a note:

"As for the general scheme of Comrade Lenin, it seems to us unacceptable in that it starts from the assumption that the bourgeois-democratic revolution is ended, and counts upon an immediate transformation of this revolution into a socialist revolution."^[14]

On his arrival in Russia, Lenin’s immediate task was therefore to convince the Bolshevik Party of the new perspective. He needed to ‘rearm’ the party. Lenin arrived on the night of 3 (16) April and attended the Party conference the following day, where he presented his theses in his own name, such was his isolation. These are outlined in ‘The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution’. He deals here with his attitude to the imperialist war.

"The slightest concession to revolutionary defencism is a betrayal of socialism, a complete renunciation of internationalism, no matter by what fine phrases and ‘practical’ considerations it may be justified." ^[15]

This was clearly aimed not only at the ‘moderate’ socialists, but at Kamenev and Stalin and the views they held.

Nevertheless, he explained the Party needed to approach “the broad mass of the people in a different way.”^[16] He said:

"The mass believers in revolutionary defencism are honest, not in a personal, but in a class sense, i.e. they belong to classes (workers and the peasant poor) which in actual fact have nothing to gain from annexations and the subjugation of other peoples."^[17]

It was necessary to explain the real nature of the war and that only the overthrow of the capitalist governments could deliver a real democratic peace.

At the time of the outbreak of the war in 1914, given the isolation of the Party and the confusion that existed, Lenin aimed his ideas at the cadres. He had advocated revolutionary defeatism, namely opposition to the imperialist nature and aims of the war, to firm-up the cadres against the prevailing mood of defencism. Even then, Lenin had made a distinction between the honest defencist workers, and the imperialist standpoint of the social patriots and the bourgeois government.

Very few of the ‘old Bolsheviks’ were convinced of Lenin’s stance about a new revolution / Image: public domain

Now, he was aiming his ideas at a mass audience, which meant a change in his presentation. While the content was the same as before, his approach was different.

He had to tailor his view to take into consideration the views of the honest defencists, ‘patiently explaining’ the nature of the imperialist war. This change is taken up fully in Lenin Selected Writings: On Imperialist War, recently published by Wellred Books, which contains his writings on this question.

For Lenin, it was now time to break decisively with the traitors of the old International, as well as the ‘bog’ of Zimmerwald, the first gathering of internationalists in 1915, which was quite politically amorphous. Zimmerwald was linked to the centrists around Kautsky – ‘Marxists’ in words and phrases, but reformist in deeds. There was no time for prevarication.

"It is we who must found, and right now, without delay, a new, revolutionary, proletarian International^[18]

"… it is time to cast off the soiled shirt and put on clean linen."^[19]

Very few of the ‘old Bolsheviks’ were convinced of Lenin’s stance about a new revolution. The old guard were wedded to the traditional position and simply repeated the old arguments against Lenin’s position. The Mensheviks and others thought he had gone mad. Stalin had even come out in favour of unity with the Mensheviks, despite all that Lenin had said on the question.

Following the April Conference (24-29 April, Old Style), Lenin had managed to use his authority to win a majority, starting with the rank and file, for his new position that rearmed the Party with the perspective of workers’ power. This rearming was absolutely decisive.

Despite the overthrow of tsarism, the masses were still faced with widespread misery and hunger, as the bread ration was steadily reduced. Rising prices provoked strikes and lockouts. Demonstrations became a daily occurrence. Land-hungry peasants seized the land. Buffeted by events, cracks began to emerge in the Provisional Government, which was under pressure from all sides.

With the growing disenchantment with the conduct of the war, the government was pressurised into renouncing all imperialist aims and was obliged to inform the Allies. The Foreign Minister and leader of the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets), Pavel Milyukov, went back on this promise, which, when made public, provoked uproar. Spontaneous demonstrations broke out. Banners appeared bearing ‘Down With the Provisional Government!’ and ‘Down With Milyukov!’ The extent of the mass protests were such that Milyukov was forced to resign. He was later joined by another minister, Guchkov. This provoked the first government crisis.

Given the frustrations and fury, there were sections of workers who wanted to immediately overthrow the Provisional Government. This was clearly premature, as the rest of the country was lagging behind, where the government still had reserves of support. As a result, Lenin attempted to steer the Party as well as educate its ranks against adventurism. Lenin was therefore forced to intervene to restrain such moods. He explained:

"The slogan ‘Down with the Provisional Government!’ is an incorrect one at the present moment because, in the absence of a solid (i.e. a class-conscious and organised) majority of the people on the side of the revolutionary proletariat, such a slogan is either an empty phrase, or, objectively, amounts to attempts of an adventurist character."^[20]

The task, as he saw it, was to ‘patiently explain’ the Bolshevik policies to the masses and not engage in ultra-left actions. While they were in a small minority, the Party needed to carry on its propaganda work and to systematically organise its forces. As part of this, Lenin was in favour of peaceful demonstrations that avoided violence, as a show of strength, while urging the workers to put pressure on the Soviets.

The Provisional Government was joined at the hip to the imperialists, given their reliance on foreign loans to continue the war. With Kerensky (a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (SRs)) becoming Minister of War, they soon agreed to undertake a new military offensive in June, which was doomed to fail. This only made matters worse, further undermining their support. The growing influence of Bolshevism was reflected in the many banners with the inscription ‘All Power to the Soviets’, that were now carried on the streets of Petrograd and elsewhere.

A renewed government crisis resulted in a reshuffle where Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries joined the capitalist parties in the new coalition government. Lenin skilfully opposed this move and called for the ‘moderate socialists’ to break with the bourgeoisie. This was summed up in the Bolshevik slogan: ‘Down With the Ten Capitalist Ministers!’

The Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders could feel the ground shifting under their feet. Through their control of the Soviet Executive Committee, they were able to ban a demonstration called by the Bolsheviks. When the Executive called its own demonstration for 18 June (1 July), it backfired and the influence of the Bolsheviks was for all to see. “In one way or another, 18 June will go down as a turning-point in the history of the Russian Revolution” wrote Lenin.^[21]

A class shift was now taking place in the revolution. The ranks of the Bolshevik Party swelled with new recruits. The Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders panicked, but behind them stood the bourgeoisie and the imperialist powers. In early July, a mass spontaneous demonstration led to violent outbreaks, stirred up by provocateurs. A huge campaign of slander was then launched against the Bolsheviks, accusing them of orchestrating an armed uprising. In fact, the Bolsheviks attempted to channel the demonstration along peaceful lines to avoid premature clashes. Lenin, feeling unwell, had left Petrograd before these events, but rushed back on 4 (17) July, where he delivered a speech from the balcony of Kshesinskaya’s Palace that ended with an appeal for “firmness, steadfastness and vigilance.”

Nevertheless, a hue and cry went up against Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. The counter-revolution went on the offensive to crush the movement. Lenin was accused of being a German agent and was forced into hiding. The Bolsheviks, hundreds of whom were arrested, were in effect driven underground. In face of the outrageous slanders against the Bolsheviks, Lenin concluded:

"All hopes for a peaceful development of the Russian revolution have vanished for good. This is the objective situation: either complete victory for the military dictatorship, or victory for the workers’ armed uprising…"^[22]

Given the fact that the Soviets were in the hands of the witch-hunters, Lenin now believed the slogan of ‘All Power to the Soviets’, while possible in April, June and early July, was now no longer appropriate. The July Days had transformed everything and signified the temporary victory of the counter-revolution, including the out-and-out betrayal of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks.

Faced with the Kornilov revolt, Lenin argued for the Party to take up the fight against the attempted coup / Image: public domain

Kerensky soon became the new Prime Minister and a government reshuffle drew in a majority of ‘moderate socialists’ into the coalition, although the capitalist Cadets still called the shots.

It was a period of sudden changes and abrupt turns. By the end of August, the Russian bourgeoisie was looking towards a real dictatorship – a real strongman – that would sweep away the ‘democrats’. This came in the form of Kornilov, a general who led a revolt pledging to put an end to all this anarchy. This turn of events was described by Lenin as “downright unbelievably sharp”.^[23]

He wrote to the Central Committee (CC) at the end of August, in the midst of the crisis:

"It is possible that these lines will come too late, for events are developing with a rapidity that sometimes makes one’s head spin."^[24]

Faced with the Kornilov revolt, Lenin argued for the Party to take up the fight against the attempted coup, but at the same time that they must not offer the Kerensky government any political support. While they would fight alongside Kerensky’s troops, they would also expose Kerensky’s weaknesses and vacillations.

"It would be wrong to think that we have moved farther away from the task of the proletariat winning power. No, we have come very close to it, not directly, but from the side. At the moment we must campaign not so much directly against Kerensky, as indirectly against him, namely, by demanding a more and more active, truly revolutionary war against Kornilov. […] We must relentlessly fight against phrases about the defence of the country, about a united front of revolutionary democrats, about supporting the Provisional Government, etc., etc., since they are just empty phrases. We must say: now is the time for action; you SR and Menshevik gentlemen have long since worn those phrases threadbare. Now is the time for action; the war against Kornilov must be conducted in a revolutionary way, by drawing the masses in, by arousing them, by inflaming them (Kerensky is afraid of the masses, afraid of the people)."^[25]

We can see the way in which Lenin skilfully turns the situation to the advantage of the Bolsheviks in leading the fight against Kornilov, using revolutionary means. In this way he educates the party in the art of flexible tactics. We should remember that Lenin was still in hiding in Finland. Nevertheless, the Kerensky government was forced to lean for support on the Bolsheviks, given their growing influence. The Bolsheviks, in turn, seized the opportunity to arm the workers and revive the Red Guards, the factory based militias set up by workers set up to defend the revolution.

In the end, following the fraternisation of the Bolsheviks and workers of Petrograd with Kornilov’s troops, his forces melted away. Following his defeat, a new situation opened up, as Kerensky’s authority rapidly declined. Furthermore, during the struggle, the Soviets once more came to life. Lenin therefore renewed the call of ‘All Power to the Soviets’, in which again he raised the idea of a peaceful development of the revolution.

In the middle of September, Lenin offered a ‘compromise’ to the Mensheviks and SRs for them to agree to establish a government wholly and exclusively responsible to the Soviets, which would also take over power locally. This would guarantee, he said, the peaceful development of the revolution.

"Now, and only now, perhaps during only a few days or a week or two, such a government could be set up and consolidated in a perfectly peaceful way. In all probability it could secure the peaceful advance of the whole Russian revolution, and provide exceptionally good chances for great strides in the world movement towards peace and the victory of socialism.

[…]

"I think the Bolsheviks would advance no other conditions, trusting that the revolution would proceed peacefully and party strife in the Soviets would be peacefully overcome thanks to really complete freedom of propaganda and to the immediate establishment of a new democracy in the composition of the Soviets (new elections) and in their functioning.

"Perhaps this is already impossible? Perhaps. But if there is even one chance in a hundred, the attempt at realising this opportunity is still worthwhile."^[26]

These lines completely refute the false idea put out by bourgeois historians that Lenin was in favour of violence and bloodshed. For much of 1917, Lenin argued as a minority for ‘peaceful propaganda’, based upon the slogans of bread, land and peace. He nevertheless placed the responsibility for ensuring a peaceful development of the revolution on the shoulders of the Mensheviks and SRs, who should take the power.

The failure of the Provisional Government to deliver any of its promises led to a crumbling of its support. The experience of the Kornilov coup sealed its fate.

New elections to the Soviets, especially in Petrograd and Moscow, now led to a victory for the Bolsheviks. This opened up a new critical chapter in the revolution. “The majority of the people are on our side”, wrote Lenin. “The majority gained in the Soviets of the metropolitan cities resulted from the people coming over to our side.”^[27] The Soviets now had to assume power. This was not Blanquism and the seizure of power by a minority. It would represent the victory of the revolutionary masses, who were now looking to the Bolsheviks to translate words into deeds.

Kerensky attempted to regroup with the announcement of a so-called Democratic Conference, where all parties should participate. Lenin opposed participation, having now directed the Party’s attention towards insurrection, but he was overruled. This, he felt, simply wasted time. The revolution was maturing and there was no time to lose. The trust of the masses could not be taken for granted.

For much of 1917, Lenin argued as a minority for ‘peaceful propaganda’, based upon the slogans of bread, land and peace / Image: public domain

Trotsky, who had worked closely with the Bolsheviks after his return to Russia in May, joined the Party in August and was elected to its Central Committee. His collaboration with Lenin was very close and he was elected the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. He fully supported Lenin’s opposition to participation in the Democratic Conference. This led Lenin to write:

"Trotsky was for the boycott. Bravo, Comrade Trotsky!

"Boycottism was defeated in the Bolshevik group at the Democratic Conference.

"Long live the boycott!"^[28]

They soon carried the day and Trotsky led the Bolshevik walkout.

The situation was becoming critical, politically and economically. The situation of dual power in the country could not last: either the Soviets would take power and sweep away the Provisional Government, or the Soviets would be crushed by the counter-revolution. Everything was now in the balance, and Lenin fully realised it.

Using the Revolutionary Military Committee established by the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky began to make links with the Petrograd garrison and preparations for the October insurrection. The seizure of power would mean that the slogan of ‘All Power to the Soviets’ would become a reality after almost nine months.

During August and September, as well as directing the attention of the Bolsheviks to the task of power, Lenin wrote his famous theoretical work while in hiding in Finland, The State and Revolution. This work, together with The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It, another important work, have been left out of this selection solely due to their length. They are, however, readily available. The State and Revolution is published by Wellred Books, and The Impending Catastrophe has been reproduced online by In Defence of Marxism (marxist.com), both of which are an essential read!

Towards the end of September, Lenin wrote that “we are on the threshold of a world proletarian revolution”, to which he tied the fate of the second Russian Revolution.^[29]

"The crisis has matured. The whole future of the Russian revolution is at stake. The honour of the Bolshevik Party is in question. The whole future of the international workers’ revolution for socialism is at stake."^[30]

However, Lenin, who was still in hiding in Finland, was fearful that the opportunity to take power would be missed. He saw a tendency in the Bolshevik leadership which was vacillating. He did not want the insurrection to be delayed until the opening of the Soviet Congress. He therefore wrote a stern letter to the CC and the Petrograd and Moscow leaderships urging immediate action. The foot-dragging of the CC and the deletion of his criticisms from his articles led him to tender his resignation from the CC to allow him the freedom to campaign openly within the ranks of the Party. But given the pace of events it was a threat that was not actually carried through.

However, on the eve of the October Revolution there was a crisis within the Bolshevik leadership. On 10 (23) October, Lenin, still in disguise, emerged from hiding to attend the CC meeting. He had been kicking his heels in Finland since July. Now he had the opportunity to address the Bolshevik leaders directly. Lenin delivered a report on the current situation and urged the immediate organisation of an uprising. With ten votes against two, they agreed to Lenin’s proposal of an insurrection. But the date was left hanging in the air.

The next day, the two who voted against an insurrection, Zinoviev and Kamenev, issued a statement in opposition to the CC decision, which was distributed to the regional and executive leaderships.

Another extended CC meeting was called almost a week later on 16 (29) October, where Lenin reiterated his plea for an immediate insurrection, but there still existed some hesitation and reservations. Again, Zinoviev and Kamenev raised their opposition. After much heated discussion, Lenin put his resolution to the vote, with twenty in favour, three abstentions and two against.

However, breaking party discipline, on 18 (31) October, Zinoviev and Kamenev went public, writing in the non-party paper Novaya Zhizn about their opposition to the proposed insurrection. They instead urged the Party to form a large opposition in a future Constituent Assembly, and not undertake an adventure, as they saw it. Lenin replied angrily in a letter to the CC on 19 October (1 November) denouncing them as “strikebreakers” in shamefully warning the enemy of their plans.^[31] He called for their expulsion from the Party.

The CC held on the following day, where Lenin was absent and hiding in Petrograd, heard Lenin’s letter but refused to expel the strikebreakers, who received simply a reprimand.

By this time, Trotsky had been busy with the organisation of the insurrection. He was in favour of the insurrection on the date of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, to give greater legitimacy to the revolution. Even the day before the insurrection, Lenin was still urging the Bolsheviks to take power, clearly unaware of Trotsky’s advanced preparations: “The government is tottering. It must be given the death-blow at all costs. To delay action is fatal.”^[32] In the end, Trotsky’s tactics proved correct. The insurrection was carried through smoothly on 25 October (7 November) under his leadership of the Revolutionary Military Committee and in the name of the Petrograd Soviet.

It was none other than Stalin who acknowledged Trotsky’s key role in the revolution / Image: public domain

It was none other than Stalin who acknowledged Trotsky’s key role in the revolution. He wrote:

"All the work of practical organisation of the insurrection was conducted under the immediate leadership of the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky. It is possible to declare with certainty that the swift passing of the garrison to the side of the Soviet and the bold execution of the work of the Revolutionary Military Committee, the Party owes principally and above all to comrade Trotsky."^[33]

Following the successful insurrection, Lenin was to emerge from hiding to appear at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets where the victory was announced.

According to John Reed, who was present:

"Now Lenin, gripping the edge of the reading stand, letting his little winking eyes travel over the crowd as he stood there waiting, apparently oblivious of the long-rolling ovation which lasted for several minutes."^[34]

When the applause died down, Lenin, who was full of emotion, simply said:

"We shall now proceed to construct the socialist order."^[35]

As head of the new government, Lenin announced a series of decrees on peace without annexations, the complete publication of all the secret treaties, then on land, which abolished private ownership and gave land to the peasants, the right of nations to self-determination and many more. Within the space of barely twenty-four hours after the seizure of power, the new Soviet Government, the Council of People’s Commissars, showed its determination to carry out its programme.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets had become the highest power in the land. It represented the first blow against world capitalism and marked the beginning of the world socialist revolution.

This was no coup behind the backs of the masses, as the bourgeois historians claim. The left Menshevik Sukhanov wrote:

"To call it [the October Revolution] a military conspiracy rather than a national uprising is utterly absurd since the [Bolshevik] Party was already the de facto power in the land, and since it enjoyed the support of the enormous majority of the people."^[36]

Lenin’s writing in this period shows the thoughts of a man bound up with the revolutionary process, who saw much further than many of those around him. His role was crucial, as can be seen from these writings, which we now make available to a wider audience.

The socialist revolution will once again be placed on the agenda in the period ahead. These writings of Lenin from 1917 will help illuminate the path to a successful worldwide proletarian revolution.

Rob Sewell,

London,

August 2024

References

[1] Trotsky, Leon, History of the Russian Revolution, Vol. 1, Wellred Books, 2022, p. 17.

[2] See ‘Note on Dates’, p. ix.

[3] Lenin, ‘Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies’, 2-4 (15-17) November 1905, Collected Works (henceforth referred to as LCW), Vol. 10, Progress Publishers, 1960, p. 21.

[4] Lenin, ‘Letters on Tactics’, 8-13 (21-26) April 1917, in this volume, p. 68.

[5] Lenin, ‘Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers’, 26 March (8 April) 1917, in this volume, p. 45.

[6] Ibid., p. 46.

[7] Ibid., p. 47.

[8] Lenin, ‘Telegram to the Bolsheviks Leaving for Russia’, 6 (19) March 1917, LCW, Vol. 23, p. 292.

[9] Lenin, ‘First Letter From Afar’, 7 (20) March 1917, in this volume, p. 11.

[10] Ibid., p. 11, emphasis in original.

[11] Ibid., emphasis in original.

[12] Ibid. p. 12.

[13] Ibid., p. 10, emphasis in original.

[14] Pravda, 8 April 1917, quoted in Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, pp. 326-7.

[15] Lenin, ‘The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution’, 10 (23) April 1917, in this volume, p. 86, emphasis in original.

[16] Ibid., p. 87, emphasis in original.

[17] Ibid., emphasis in original.

[18] Ibid., p. 104.

[19] Ibid., p. 111.

[20] 'Resolution of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(B)’, 22 April (5 May) 1917, in this volume, p. 130.

[21] Lenin, ‘The Eighteenth of June’, 20 June (3 July) 1917, in this volume, p. 196.

[22] Lenin, ‘The Political Situation’, 10 (23) July 1917, in this volume, p. 223.

[23] Lenin, ‘To the Central Committee of the RSDLP’, 30 August (12 September) 1917, in this volume, p. 282.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., p. 283, emphasis in original

[26] Lenin, ‘On Compromises’, 1-3 (14-16) September 1917, in this volume, p. 287, emphasis in original.

[27] Lenin, ‘The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power’, 12-14 (25-27) September 1917, in this volume, p. 295, emphasis in original.

[28] Lenin, ‘From a Publicist’s Diary’, 22-24 September (5-7 October) 1917, in this volume, p. 339.

[29] Lenin, ‘The Crisis Has Matured’, 29 September (13 October) 1917, in this volume, p. 352.

[30] Ibid., p. 357.

[31] Lenin, ‘Letter to the Central Committee of the RSDLP(B)’, 19 October (1 November) 1917, in this volume, p. 430.

[32] Lenin, ‘Letter to Central Committee Members’, 24 October (6 November) 1917, in this volume, p. 435, emphasis in original.

[33] Stalin, Joseph, ‘The Role of the Most Eminent Party Leaders’, Pravda, 6 November 1918, quoted in Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, Vol. 3, p. 1214, and also in Stalin, The October Revolution, Lawrence and Wishart, 1936, p. 30.

[34] Reed, John, Ten Days That Shook the World, Penguin, 1970, p. 128.

[35] Quoted in Trotsky, Leon, History of the Russian Revolution, Vol. 3, p. 1168.

[36] Quoted in Liebman, Marcel, The Russian Revolution, Vintage Books, 1972, p. 286.